MORLEY WINOGRAD

Interviewed by

Doug Ross

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

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Doug Ross: I'm Doug Ross, and I'm here interviewing Morley Winograd. Mr. Winograd you want to explain who are? When you were born, and where you were born?

Morley Winograd: I was born in Detroit. I spent the first 50 years of my life in Detroit, 1942. A member of what's called the Silent Generation, and I've had the privilege of being a player in Michigan political history.

Doug Ross: You went to high school?

Morley Winograd: Went to Berkeley High.

Doug Ross: And college?

Morley Winograd: Went to the University of Michigan.

Doug Ross: Then at a pretty young age, not too long after college, you got elected Chair of the Oakland County Democratic Party. So, tell me what was going on. What was happening to the party? What was your role or purpose going in at that time? Tell me what happened.

Morley Winograd: Yeah, I got involved in Democratic Party politics in 1968. There was obviously a great tumult in the party at that time. The reform movement, the McGovern-Kennedy efforts, and so forth. Mine was a more person reason for getting involved. I had just moved to Troy and my brother, my younger brother, had been hired as a Deputy Director in that summer to run a voter registration campaign for the county party. They couldn't find anybody in Troy, it was a relatively new suburb. Township forever, but in terms of residents very little.

Morley Winograd: He asked me if I would undertake the registration drive. I was already interested in politics, but I didn't know anything about the mechanics. I undertook it, and when the election was over I got a call from the county party saying look under state rule we have to have two people from every township, or city, on our County Executive Committee. Would you be willing to serve from Troy? The only other fellow we have on there from Troy is this guy named Ken Morris, who's the Regional Director for the UAW for Oakland County. He doesn't come to meetings that often, so we'd like you to serve.

Morley Winograd: I said yes. They asked me to serve in the Rules Committee, because again rules and reform were big in party activity at the time. Through that I got involved relatively heavily with the internal politicing in Oakland County Democratic politics. The county party chairman, George Gugasian, at the time decided not to run again in 1970. They turned to me and asked me if I would serve as chairman. That's how I got started.

Doug Ross: What was the nature of Michigan Democratic party politics? Where was the party? What was going on? What was happening?

Morley Winograd: We were busy fighting amongst ourselves. We lost the governorship a few elections before that, and so the contest was really focused on national issues. We had the folks who had supported either McGovern or Kennedy over the Vietnam War versus the Humphrey-ites and their labor allies. That was the main division. In fact, when I started I was considered a member of the reform movement. That same brother had served as Bobby Kennedy's point person for some of the convention stuff, later George McGovern after Kennedy's assassination.

Morley Winograd: So, that's where I came out of. I actually decided that the labor movement knew more about what they were doing, and ended up being their close ally.

Doug Ross: Was that, was the Liberal Labor Collation that was put together I assume by-

Morley Winograd: Soapy

Doug Ross: Soapy, Reuither and

Morley Winograd: Arthur Griffith.

Doug Ross: And so forth.

Morley Winograd: And Hucks Griffith.

Doug Ross: Right, was that coming apart at that point? Over Vietnam?

Morley Winograd: It had fallen apart over Vietnam. I knew nothing about that history, I learned it all later. That was were the delegate split. In fact the reason I got elected County Chair is that at the '68 convention the fellow who thought he was in line for the County Chairmanship, after Gugasian retired whose name unfortunately I no longer remember, had voted not with Labor for Humphrey but either for McGovern or Kennedy, and Labor decided that if they couldn't trust him on that vote they couldn't trust him to be County Chairman.

Doug Ross: How did that then develop into the State Chairmanship, and when did that happen?

Morley Winograd: Well when I got elected Country Chairman in 1970 we had a very successful election with Phil Hart's reelection. I served prior to my election as Chairman as the head of campaign in Oakland County. There was a continuation of this debate. Sandy Levin had lost the Chairmanship, had left the Chairmanship of the state party, Jim McNeely had replaced him. Jim's position with Labor and exactly where he was on all of these other issues was not clear. There was a Chairman in Macomb County by the name of John Bruff, and a Chairman of Wayne County

by the name of Bruce Miller. The three of us decided to have lunch together and start figuring out what we wanted to do as a metro Democratic force.

Morley Winograd: That's sort of how I became a bit involved in state party stuff. Had enough of a following and support to think about running for Chairman in '72. Seventy-two the Democratic party in Michigan was completely wiped out. Had a debacle of an election. Many people blamed the party Chairman Jim McNeely for taking positions that hadn't necessarily been authorized around busing and other controversial social issues. So, Labor refused to support him again, he walked away from it, and we ended up having a state party election that was between Bob Mitchell and myself. As well as an AFL candidate, Paul Donahue. That was really a Liberal Labor contest, with me being the UAW candidate.

Doug Ross: All right, so there was an AFL candidate, a UAW candidate, and kind of the liberal candidate?

Morley Winograd: And the liberal candidate. There was no decision on the first ballot, it was still a closely split party. The AFL guy dropped out in exchange for a few favors, and I became party Chairman on the second ballot.

Doug Ross: Apparently when you were running you announced that the Michigan Democratic Party should be in the main stream of American politics. Was that right? What did you think you were going in as Chair to accomplish? What did you think the party needed to do to be able to govern again in this state?

Morley Winograd: I actually ran on a platform of working together to win, that was the Winograd slogan. It was about unity, and ending some of these debilitating internal fights we were having. The main stream comment was a shot at the McGovern supporters who were still very active, and some of their policy positions. I was pretty clear that the job of the state Party Chairman was to repair the nuts and bolts, the infrastructure, of the party. To let those policy debates take place in a fair and open environment without direction or decision from the Party Chair. That's how the last one had gotten in all kinds of trouble.

Morley Winograd: I was basically saying here's where I'm at, which is over here with Labor kind of in the center of American political thought at the time. They're over there in the left, but that doesn't mean we can't work together to win elections.

Doug Ross: The UAW, was that Sam Fishman at the time?

Morley Winograd: Yeah, Sam was the state wide political director. My closest ally was a gentleman who took me under his wing in Oakland County, John Dewan. He was the Oakland Country Cap Director, but he and Sam were very good friends. Eventually Sam decided he could support me over the alternatives, anyway.

Doug Ross: Did they see you as a kind of, I mean you were the suburban businessman?

Morley Winograd: I was a small business man. I worked for my father in a retail business.

Doug Ross: So, no Labor ties?

Morley Winograd: I had zero Labor ties, so I was a great person to represent their perspective without having it be characterized as simply a knee jerk Labor reaction. It wasn't, I mean I had nothing to do with the Labor movement until I got involved in politics. I got educated. I understood a lot of it's sense, but I was interested in representing working class, middle class Democrats. That fit very well with what Labor wanted to do, because those were their members.

Doug Ross: So, what in fact became your priorities and focus? You get elected in '72, this is really fast. You're elected Oakland County Chair in '70.

Morley Winograd: Seventy.

Doug Ross: You're how old now when you take the Michigan chair? Were you 30?

Morley Winograd: Yeah, I turned 30 in November of '72 and the election was in February of '73. So, I was 30 years old, and I completely screwed up the first year or so of my Chairmanship.

Doug Ross: There was some controversy.

Morley Winograd: Yeah, tons of controversy. I got in fights with the press. I got crossways with the AFL-CIO. The liberals were still suspicious of me, so I had a fairly disastrous first year as State Party Chair.

Doug Ross: Looking back why? Inexperience?

Morley Winograd: Totally. I was completely unprepared for that level of responsibility. I'd never done any public relations stuff. I didn't understand relationships with the press, so none of that worked. I remember spending Christmas of '73 literally hunkered down in my basement waiting for Doug Fraser, the UAW, to say maybe we made a mistake, and we ought to find somebody else.

Doug Ross: Were you depressed?

Morley Winograd: I was very fortunate because in February of '74 we had a special election to fill the seat vacated by Gerald Ford's elevation to Vice President. Without much help from the state party, all though we gave them whatever help we could, a Democrat by the name of Vanderveen beat the Republican.

Doug Ross: Vanderjagt.

Morley Winograd: No, no, Dick Vanderveen beat the Republican named Vanderlaan who was the majority leader in the state senate then.

Doug Ross: So I certainly forgot.

Morley Winograd: The going away favorite to win, and Vanderveen ran in a campaign that was a referendum of Richard Nixon and Watergate. He won, and I became an instant hero, and nobody ever questioned my credentials after that. I always got elected unanimously.

Doug Ross: That point, you're a person who working with you who's very strategic at this point, were you strategic then? Did you have a sense of where you were trying to position the party? Or what the challenges were given the context?

Morley Winograd: We were focused on winning elections. It was a very tactical. Don Riegle became a Democrat the first year I was Chairman, over the Vietnam War. So, we started gaining in the congressional delegation. We had two special elections. We also elected, later that year, Bob Traxler in a repeat of the Grand Rapids election really. It was the last time Richard Nixon ever campaigned. We eliminated his political support with his inability to carry the Republican in that Eighth District around the thumb in Lansing, excuse me in Saginaw in Bay City.

Morley Winograd: So, we were into nuts and bolts. We were into figuring out the technology. Riegle helped with that and what he knew from his Republican days. We were into organizing precinct by precinct, and understanding how to do that. We were just basically surfing the scandal, which you know as a result of the '74 election Democrats took over the Michigan delegation.

Doug Ross: Good people.

Morley Winograd: People like Blanchard and Broadhead got elected that year.

Doug Ross: Bonior, I think was-

Morley Winograd: Bonior was the following year. Wolpe was that year, and Don L. Bosta got elected congress from the center of the state.

Doug Ross: Seventy-six then become a pretty eventful time, I think? There's the Regal primary, in general which I'd like to get your recollections on and what roles you played if any? Then maybe we can talk about the McGovern Rules.

Morley Winograd: Yeah, the McGovern Rules was a result of the '68 turmoil and rules. By '72, the Democrats had passed a new set of rules for selecting delegates at the National Convention. Those had been characterized as a quota system, and other things that people didn't necessarily approve of. Certainly I didn't. So, there was continuous debate in the national party over that.

Doug Ross: Were you playing a role in the national party?

Morley Winograd: Well by then in '74, maybe '73, I got a call from a guy named Don Fowler, who later became Democratic National Chairman, asking if I would support him for President for Association of State Democratic Chairs. Which is a kind of no one cares position, except the state Democratic chairs at that time because it included Vice Chairs represented one third of the votes on the Democratic National Committee. Bob Strauss was a seeking to do similar things to what I was doing in Michigan. Trying to move the party to focus on winning elections, polishing off the ruff edges on the policy stuff, and so forth.

Morley Winograd: The candidate running against Mr. Fowler, a guy by the name of Mike Vance who went on to be a great U.S. Judge out of Alabama. Fowler was out of South Carolina. Vance represented the kinds of parts of the party that had been in opposition to my candidacy. So, it was an easy thing for me to say yes, but I bargained into becoming secretary of the Association of State Democratic Chairs in return for my support, and help in the Midwest.

Morley Winograd: So, I had become active. Eventually I became president of that, but back in that organization, back in '74 Don had asked me to do that. Strauss had heard about me and knew that I had this background in rules, actually going all the way back to Oakland County. I got asked to Chair a commission that at the time was supposed to just look at the influence of presidential primaries on how Democrats chose a presidential candidate.

Doug Ross: Maybe stop for a second. Give people a little context. Why would the party have been so concerned about presidential primaries?

Morley Winograd: Primaries was an idea that you could take the delegate selection process, and therefore the nominating process, out of the "smoke filled back room". Instead of having some boss like Daly in Chicago decide who Illinois was going to vote for and do it so that it was a unanimous vote out of Illinois, for Hubert Humphrey; that we would have more of these primaries where crusades with the McGovern Anti-War Crusade and others could have more influence. Strauss, who was very into congregational politics, and sort of the traditional constituent of the Democratic party, I wanted to curtail the use the primaries if you can believe that back then?

Morley Winograd: He was looking to put together some scholars. Gene Kirkpatrick was still a Democrat at that time. Thomas Mann was still very active. Some pretty leading political scientist, and some palls like me, to sit around and figure out what to do about all this. That's how the commission innocently started, but it soon got wrapped up in actually defining the rules for selecting delegates. My focus was actually not to do anything about primaries. I've been a very strong believer in democracy my entire political career, and always think that the people have the most wisdom in the selection process of any kind.

Morley Winograd: There was this problem of caucuses. Which tended to attract the most ideologically committed delegates, and therefore often candidates such as McGovern who were "out of the political mainstream" as we used to say. So, we

wrote a set of rules after the '76 convention that, where the convention specifically authorized us to set the rules. We wrote a set of rules that tried to limit the influence of Caucasus that rewired proportional representation in votes, so that you didn't have a unity slate kind of outcome. It ended up requiring equal division between male and female delegates to the convention. But backed off of some of the other quota systems that McGovern had put in place.

Morley Winograd: There's a great irony in all of that when you get older. The reason President Obama, who I strongly support, got elected president was because his ability to win Caucasus, and not necessarily primaries. Although he did alright in primaries, and clearly was the best candidate for the Democrats to nominate that year. Even though those rules have gone through many ideration since, the actual framework of the National Party Rules, the actually numerical order, was established by that commission. As well as some of the things like making sure it was done by Democrats and not Republicans, the selection process.

Morley Winograd: Despite all that, it is proven to me beyond a shadow of a doubt that rules are irrelevant. That's really not where you ought to focus your political activities, so anybody listening to this should never bother a moment of time on trying to fix the rules. All though that's just exactly what the Republicans are about to try and do.

Doug Ross: When the Riegle phenomenon, Riegle changes parties.

Morley Winograd: Yes, that primary.

Doug Ross: So, talk to us about that primary, and that general, and the role of the Michigan party, and your role specifically.

Morley Winograd: Well the reason Bonior got elected in '76 was one of the candidates in that primary was Jim O'Hara whose seat Bonior got elected to. He was the traditional labor liberal Democrat out of Macomb County. Very pro civil rights and it's hard to sort all that back out again in terms of where constituents are these days. Very much a Labor guy, actually into rules, but very much into the liberal tradition of the party.

Morley Winograd: He was opposed in the primary by Dick Austin, who was our Sectary of State. State wide African American elected official, probably one of the, if not the, leading African American office holder in the country. He authored 'Motor Voter' and all those wonderful good things. Then there was this sub start named Don Riegle, who had only been a Democrat for a couple years. Had been sort of the enemy of the Labor fellas in Flint when he was a Republican. He decided that he was going to be a candidate to replace the venerable Phil Hart, who didn't run because he was ill. Eventually died of his illness, but who was deservedly a legend in his time. A conscience of the senate. The reason there is a Hart senate office building, and so forth.

Morley Winograd: So, the party generally thought Riegle just needed to wait his turn. Besides which we didn't really trust him as a turncoat kind of guy. Always been a maverick in his career. People sort of sorted themselves out between Austin and O'Hara. Now I was Party Chairman, so I had a public neutrality face. Privately I was a very good friend of Jim O'Hara's, and did whatever I could to help him out. He was completely out of his element in a state wide television dominated primary. That's not the politics that O'Hara had grown up with, or been elected to. So, he was a distant third in that primary.

Morley Winograd: Austin, who should have won that primary, got entangled in a controversy over the patronage system of the Sectary of State's office. Back then civil servants didn't give you your driver's licenses, there was no DMV or Department of Motor Vehicles of any kind. You just went to the store front that somebody ran and they sold license plates. In return for getting that franchise from the Sectary of State they contributed some of their income, and I'm sure voluntary contributions, to the party of their choice. Which turned out to be the Democratic party.

Morley Winograd: Well the free press did a big expose of it. We were obviously just after Nixon, Watergate, the kind of political reform you and I engaged in, in that same time period. So, it became something that Dick couldn't shake in the courts of that primary election. Riegle won, and he kind of won going away. It was far from certain that he'd be elected senator, because the Republicans nominated a congressional candidate named Esch from Ann Arbor who was thought to be a pretty powerful candidate statewide. Riegle himself got in all kinds of political trouble over scandals, personal scandals, not the kind of scandal that ensnared Austin, if it was a scandal.

Morley Winograd: But he did a fantastic job of campaigning and he won, and he went on to serve with distinction.

Doug Ross: Did you have much of a role once he won the primary?

Morley Winograd: Oh, yes.

Doug Ross: Did you work together?

Morley Winograd: His political guy called me and said, "Look, we won the primary. The party's not happy with us. Can you think of anybody we could bring into the campaign? We've got to work with all these local party organizations." Again, back door organization, which was my forte. I recommended a gentleman by the name of Rick Wiener, who went on to later make his fame by helping elect Jim Blanchard, became state party chair. But at that time, he was mostly a Detroit figure.

Morley Winograd: I suggested Rick go to work for him, and Rick called me and said, "I got a call from the Riegle campaign. They want me to run their political operation. Do you

have any idea how they won? Because I'm still trying to figure it out and I don't want to walk into something I don't know anything about." My answer, which he and I both have joked about over the years, was, "Well, he kind of won with smoke and mirrors." Rick went in there and helped him win with more than that.

Doug Ross: Just for the record, given that we're continually involved in various kinds of scandals, sex scandals and so forth, what was the scandal involving Riegle?

Morley Winograd: Well, with Riegle, there were tapes that he made making love to somebody who wasn't his wife and reflecting on their images that were in the mirrored ceiling, as I recall. This scandal broke in the Detroit News. I think Martin Hayden was the editor of the Detroit News at the time. It broke on the weekend, and the Riegle campaign went into seclusion to try and figure out what to do about it. Canceled its appearances. It was still a very close election at that point. He was ahead, but it was close.

Morley Winograd: The first campaign appearance that they could not get out of was on that Monday, and it was in front of, of all things, the Detroit Women's Economic Club, which was the sort of middle class or upper class women involved in business in Detroit. The two of them, candidates, were supposed to have a debate. I was on the dais as the Democratic Party chairman. I was sitting next to Riegle, who was sitting next to Esch, and then on Esch's left was Martin Hayden. I think the Detroit News had actually sponsored the debate.

Morley Winograd: I just had no idea what Riegle was going to do at this event. You couldn't have thought of a worse audience or a worse reintroduction to the campaign, given the scandal.

Doug Ross: The election's actually to be held the next day?

Morley Winograd: No, no, the election was still a few weeks away.

Doug Ross: No, a few weeks away, okay.

Morley Winograd: A few weeks away. They flipped a coin, and Riegle won the coin flip, and he chose to go first in the debate. When the debate started, he got up and he started into a conversation about why he had run for the Senate. He had a commercial on at the time with this little black kid who wanted to be a doctor, and he wanted to make sure that there were opportunities for that child to rise above his circumstances and become all of the wonderful things that Don Riegle believed in and was talking about.

Morley Winograd: Then he interrupted himself, "But of course, I can't spend any time today talking about that with all of you because of that man," and then he pointed to Martin Hayden, not to Esch, "who decided out of personal vendetta to destroy my family and invade my personal privacy." He went on to rant and point fingers

and scream at Hayden and concluded, as I recall, although I could be wrong, but I think his conclusion was, "And anyone who wants to be your United States Senator should have better moral character," better moral character, "and greater ethics than to sit next to Martin Hayden, so you should not vote for Esch. You should vote for me."

Morley Winograd: I was absolutely stunned, but I was even more stunned by the audience reaction. The Detroit Women's Economic Club gave Riegle a standing ovation. It was the greatest political performance I have seen in my entire life, and he went on to win. Esch had no idea what to say. He was dumbfounded. He couldn't figure out whether to go for a dive back into the scandal, stay away from it, debate. He had no idea what to do.

Doug Ross: Great story. '76, the rules of the game, obviously, you did think back then mattered in some way because you got involved in campaign finance and the ground on which ultimately a Democrat might win a governorship, because it had been some time and was still to be some time.

Morley Winograd: It was in 1962 that Swainson had lost and we hadn't had it since. There was a great outcry in the country for campaign finance reform, and we passed Watergate-related laws in '74 nationally, and states were imitating them. In '75-'76, we had the good fortune of having a guy named Doug Ross be chairman of the Michigan Common Cause, and you were doing your citizen-oriented thing to make sure these were clean laws and so forth. We wanted to reform the campaign finance laws as well, and our biggest goal was to limit the influence of Republican money in the race.

Morley Winograd: Back then, not only did rules matter, in our opinion, as the Republicans think they do now, but money mattered, as Republicans think it does now, and it probably still does. But the Democrats were at a terrible disadvantage just in terms of the politics of the state at that time. We were divided very much along economic lines. Outside of labor, there wasn't any large pool of resource, maybe some people in the Jewish community, who could be counted on as contributors. Well, I guess except for Dick Austin's secretary of state operation, but that kind of went away with his defeat in the primary.

Morley Winograd: We wrote campaign finance law, as you well recall, that not only substituted public funding in the general election, but allowed for public funds to be given in the primary to candidates who could raise small donations on their own and have them matched. That was obviously modeled after the national presidential primary laws, which we no longer abide by.

Morley Winograd: But they were a dramatic change in Michigan, and we got it through a Democratic house and, I think, a Republican senate. Milliken signed the law but challenged its constitutionality, and the Supreme Court struck down the ethics reforms, the lobbying reforms that we had also put in place. But the gubernatorial primary public funding provisions and the general election public funding provisions survived the court test, and we were able to run campaigns

first in '78 unsuccessfully and then in '82 successfully using that money and that formulation. In that sense, we were able to at least temporarily adjust the playing field.

Doug Ross: You're party chair. Carter wins in '76.

Morley Winograd: Again, thanks to the Watergate scandal. That did a lot for me, yes.

Doug Ross: Yes. Your timing was good there, no question. Then the question becomes how do the Democrats elect a governor finally? What's your thoughts on it? What's your strategy? How did that eventually play out in your mind?

Morley Winograd: Well, there were several challenges for the Democratic Party to elect a governor. One of them was money, which we sort of fixed with the law. Another was the tendency of Democrats in the suburbs, later to be known as Reagan Democrats but not back then, to split their ticket. And to the Romney-Milliken team's credit, on behalf of the Republican candidate who they perceived as being less obligated to a special interest, whether that was labor or, in some suburbanites' minds, the black community of Detroit, or just Detroit, and as a result we were always having difficulty with the suburban vote.

Morley Winograd: Now, it's kind of ironic today. We carry the suburban vote. Blanchard got elected with the suburban vote to Congress in '74, and one of the reasons he was successful in '82 was his support and knowledge of that vote in the suburbs. But back then, it was a real urban-suburban challenge. We ended up after the '78 election, in which our candidate Bill Fitzgerald, may he rest in peace, was defeated. We had a state central committee, the decision-making body of the state party, meeting to review the results of the election. We had started to come off of our '74-'76 high. We didn't do badly but obviously didn't win the governorship or much else in '78.

Morley Winograd: We decided that the problem was that Mayor Coleman Young had been less than a loyal Democrat in the '78 election. The truth of any of that, I do not know.

Doug Ross: Hold a second. Let's go back, because this is another important and interesting character that is a player during your chairmanship.

Morley Winograd: Yeah. Yeah.

Doug Ross: Where did your relationship go back to, the two of you? What was it during that period of the '70s?

Morley Winograd: Yeah, well, Coleman and I had no relationship. He was very hostile to me and I to him. He was a state senator, and then he decided he was going to become mayor of Detroit at a time when racial tensions were very high in Detroit over some kind of stop and frisk, I don't remember what they called it, operation by

the Detroit Police Department, whose head was now the candidate for mayor. Again, all those names elude me.

Doug Ross: Gibbs?

Morley Winograd: Roman Gibbs was the mayor, but this was his police chief running to replace him, and I don't know who that was. So, Coleman did what he always did, which was run a very polarizing campaign, black-white, and leveraged the fact that the black population of Detroit had finally gotten large enough and participative enough that he was able to get elected almost entirely with the black vote, and made it very clear after his election that he really was going to focus on that community and their needs, and whites could stay or leave, but it wasn't going to be his concern.

Morley Winograd: He had an historical position in the Michigan Democratic Party. Before he ever became mayor, he was one of the two, back when there were only two, members of the Michigan Democratic National Committee, and he was the first African-American to serve on the Democratic National Committee sort of post-reconstruction days, or whatever. He had a proud claim to being the voice of the black community in Michigan Democratic Party politics, and now as mayor a lot of power to exercise that claim.

Morley Winograd: That had happened, I don't know when the mayoralty election was. It was '75 or '77, probably, but whatever it was. In '78, of course, again, a lot of our success statewide depended upon, at that time, winning enough of the Detroit vote to overcome the suburban and Out-of-state vote.

Doug Ross: Which I assume was a turnout issue primarily?

Morley Winograd: It was all turnout.

Doug Ross: Although Milliken did have some history of doing better with African-American voters.

Morley Winograd: He did. Part of his ticket splitting was stronger in the suburbs but capable in the black community. He was sympathetic to Detroit issues. He was, after all, a moderate Republican. Back in those days, there were such things. Anyway, he did pretty well in the black community. We decided, party leadership, that one of the reasons he did well is that Coleman had not done his share as a Democrat, not necessarily as mayor, to bring out the vote. In fact, there were some allegations that Coleman had cut a deal with Milliken, in exchange for some legislative favors for the city of Detroit, to not only not actively bring his troops out for Fitzgerald, but to actually work in kind of an underhanded way on behalf of Milliken.

Morley Winograd: Historians will have to determine if any of that was true, but we believed it enough to decide that as our delegation to the Democratic National Committee

was shrinking because of the shrinking Democratic vote in Michigan, that we would have an African-American delegate, there was now more than one, obviously, be the person who was dropped out of the Democratic National Committee representation, and in reward for party loyalty we elected a gentleman named Tony Bolosky from Bay City, who represented kind of the white ethnic vote that was still part of our vision of the Democratic coalition, instead as well as part of this reduction.

Morley Winograd: As a result of all that, the 1st and 13th Districts, the two congressional black districts, walked out of the party, never came to a Jeff-Jack meeting as long as I was party chair, and had a sort of public condemnation of me and my party leadership.

Doug Ross: Did you and the mayor ever have a direct face-to-face discussion about any of this?

Morley Winograd: No, we never did. What happened was I left the party chairmanship in '79, not over that, but for personal family reasons, to start earning some money, and I had a meeting with Malcolm Dade, Jr., I think, was his real name; we always called him Malcolm Dade. In which I told Malcom, and this extreme division and split had now gone on for a couple years, not just '79, but '80. This might have been '81 when I had the conversation with Malcolm, that the 1st and 13th District were demanding an apology from me before they'd ever re-enter the Democratic Party, and that I was still on the National Committee, but I really wasn't anybody else in the Democratic Party.

Morley Winograd: They had a chairman, and her name was Olivia Maynard. She was trying to do a good job, and that they ought to take a softer position on that. He suggested that there might be a solution given the fact that they'd driven me out, in their opinion, of the chairmanship, which I don't think was true. He thought it might be possible for there to be some kind of reconciliation as long as there was something that approached or looked like an apology issued on my part.

Morley Winograd: I actually did not issue that apology until Blanchard was nominated for governor. Then we orchestrated that at the party convention that followed as a sign of unity that Blanchard's candidacy could bring to the party.

Doug Ross: What role do you perceive Coleman played in the Blanchard race? Of course, we were in a terrible recession again.

Morley Winograd: Yeah.

Doug Ross: And Milliken wasn't running again.

Morley Winograd: Milliken wasn't running. A guy named Richard Headley, who was the first wave of what we would consider mainstream Republicanism today but was considered an extreme right-winger back then, anti-tax, anti-government,

certainly anti-Detroit. So Coleman had no problem supporting Blanchard in his first campaign. I think in the second campaign, Bill Lucas, the black Republican county sheriff of Wayne County, was Blanchard's opponent, and never really a real competitor.

Morley Winograd: But I know that Blanchard felt in '92 when he lost in a very close election to Engler that there still was a problem with turnout in Detroit, and whether he blamed Coleman or not, I don't know, but it was always a very rocky relationship throughout that governorship with the mayor of Detroit. I wasn't part of the administration, don't know enough about it to know how much of that carried over.

Morley Winograd: My rold, and I had several with Blanchard, but my role in that particular context was to be the one who brought reconciliation by saying something apologetic and having Coleman, I don't know, hold up my hand or shake my hand or something, on the dais, with Blanchard being the one who brought us together, and that was to take care of that public perception for whatever it was worth.

Doug Ross: Essentially, your sort of main stage role in Michigan politics is the decade of the '70's, basically.

Morley Winograd: Yes, from '73 to '79.

Doug Ross: Yeah, right. As you look back at it, it's 30 years later, 35 years later, what was that about, do you think? What was happening politically? As you look at it, what role did you play? What, with hindsight, might you have done differently?

Morley Winograd: Well, I firmly believed, as party chairman, I spoke about it publicly, that the only way Democrats in Michigan could win statewide was with the energizing of the New Deal coalition. Labor, ethnic whites, African-American voters, people who shared a common economic interest in having a government that worked for the little guy or the middle class or the forgotten American, as FDR would say. Growing up in the 1960's, that was a perfectly reasonable position to hold because it had been true for my memory. From 1932 to 1964, it was very much true.

Morley Winograd: It was not true during the '70s, probably not even true in '68 when Nixon got elected and beat Humphrey, although that was only the first sign of the change, and it was obviously not true by 1980 when Ronald Reagan beat Carter. But I didn't actually come to a conclusion that it was the wrong approach until 1984. I remember writing a memo, and I think I've shared it with you, before Mondale went down in defeat in '84, that began by saying, "The Democratic Party has finally nominated a candidate who believes everything we believe. He believes in an activist government. He believes in a progressive taxation system. He believes in the social policies that we agree with. He has a foreign policy that we're comfortable with, and he's about to lose 49 out of 50 states, and if that's true, we are wrong. We need a different messenger. We need a different

message. We need to completely reshape the Democratic Party nationally and therefore in the state of Michigan."

Morley Winograd: But that was not until 1984. During the 1970's, my fight was to try and keep intact and energize, keep intact through unity, working together to win, and energize with the right candidates, with the right kind of messages and political programs and policies, the old coalition.

Doug Ross: Does Blanchard, in your mind, I don't know whether it would have been clear at the time or subsequently, foreshadow some of what a next coalition would win with, or was he, in your view, the last one to win essentially with a New Deal coalition?

Morley Winograd: Well, that's a very good question. I think when we were busy recruiting Blanchard, we did so because he had proven to be an effective vote-getter with the suburban constituency. Well, he represented southeast Oakland County and a whole bunch of Warren and the Macomb County area around it, as I recall his district back then, and had defeated a Republican candidate in the process. That was a scandal-tinged election in '74.

Morley Winograd: But I think it was no more than, oh well he can help us carry the suburbs. I don't think it was coalition politics necessarily, but I do know that after he got elected in '82 and in order to take the state out of the deficit it faced, raised income taxes costing the Democrats the majority they had elected in the state senate through a couple of recall petitions that he and I had a conversation about what are we going to do now? Remember, I'm not in his government, I never was. He and I remain very close political allies. He attended the very first meeting of the officers of the Michigan Democratic Party after my election. He was there representing attorney general, Frank Kelley and we and we met and stayed friends forever after that and relied on him for political advice all the time and I helped orchestrate some of the Democratic primary in his congressional situation.

Morley Winograd: But I remember and after that sort of really difficult time for him after he got elected governor and the tax issue had passed, but he still had to deal with the aftermath of it and Democrats were starting to get recalled. We talked about what we should do and what he should do. And I suggested that he think of a policy and program set that would be surprising coming from a Democrat and that if he wanted to establish his credentials for his reelection and for his governance, he ought to come across as different than your regular Democrat. Now, nobody had heard of the new Democrats of Bill Clinton at the time, although Bill was a friend of Blanchard's. And that all didn't take place until '86, '87, '88, but we did in fact put together a program where Blanchard was aggressive on welfare fraud. He was in favor of more parental involvement and responsibility in the world of education. He got involved in, and through you as well, in the government as a venture capitalist, if you will, to try and stimulate economic development. And all of these things were part of that first conversation about you'll get headlines, that'll be good headlines, if you do

things that Democrats aren't expected to do. Don't be a Republican, but do things Democrats aren't expected to do. So in that way, he foreshadowed some of that.

Doug Ross: So at that point to a great degree, then your involvement in politics really becomes much more national and not very Michigan-focused is that fair?

Morley Winograd: Two things going on. When I left the Michigan Democratic Party, I think I was fortunate enough to get a job with Michigan Bell, which turned into a job with AT&T which became the two decade career for me.

Doug Ross: So outside the state.

Morley Winograd: No, no. I was here in Detroit all of that time. Well, I left in '92 to go to Los Angeles, but during that first decade it was all in Michigan and I was on the Democratic National Committee. So I was very much involved nationally, but my role in the Michigan world was really around Blanchard. Blanchard used me as his sounding board when he didn't want to talk to people that work for them and therefore might have their opinion colored by the need to hang onto their job or play whatever internal game was being played. Not that that ever happens amongst his cabinet members and what have you. I was kind of this subjective outsider who could tell it to him straight.

Doug Ross: And can you remember a few, you mentioned initially how to respond after this very difficult recall period. Can you remember a few other issues where you were sort of engaged to help figure out what to do?

Morley Winograd: Well, the one I remember the most, was amongst all the other difficulties that, I mean his governorship first year wasn't as bad as my first year as party chairman, but it wasn't a historical great thing. I remember we were up on Mackinaw Island and he, at end, I think it was the first time I had visited the governor's residence there and he told me privately that Tom Lewand who had been his campaign chairman and is a very close friend, was not working out as chief of staff. Not Jim, but one of the cabinet members said that the problem Tom had was that as a lawyer he had been used to handling things sequentially. And as chief of staff you have to handle a hundred things all at the same time. For whatever reason, Jim was dissatisfied with his performance and he was unable, from a friendship and personal basis to tell Tom that. Even though all kinds of people in the administration were telling him this and he was agreeing with them. So he said, rather than anybody else getting blamed for it, would you mind, me, going to tell Tom that it's not working out?

Morley Winograd: And I said, "You want me to say anything else?" He said, "Yeah. No, just tell him it's not working out." And so I did, I called Tom and I took him to lunch. I think we were on Mackinac Island, maybe it was after I came back and said, "I have a message to convey that you're not going to want to hear, but I want to convey it as it was told to me. He said, "what's that?" I said, "Blanchard says it's not

working out." And Tom says, "what does that mean?" I said, "Well now he didn't say this, but what I think it means is he wants you to leave." And he did and they hired somebody else as chief of staff.

Doug Ross: Clearly one of the challenges as you go into '82 is to recruit a candidate who can win with what may starting to be the beginning of a shifting coalition. But so how do you end up, how does Blanchard finally emerge as that candidate?

Morley Winograd: Well, I had been, in the course of my chairmanship, convening groups that were kitchen cabinet more than official. And later on you joined one of those conversations. But in that particular time period I was no longer a party chairman. So we organized something that we called the garden club, which is kind of amusing, but the coded invitation was all about growing flowers in our garden, which really referenced candidates. And I, you know, there was some labor guys there, certainly my old mentor, John, my supporter, Sam Fishman, but people like Betty Howe had served in the Blanchard administration, Macomb County was represented probably by John Bruff. Bruce Miller was still a part of it. So some of the people that went back to my original activity. Anyway, we decided that the problem in the '78 loss, now do we have the money fixed was the candidate and we didn't want another Bill Fitzgerald who has wonderful a person as he was, was a pro-life Democrat, which didn't exactly work with the coalition and we needed to figure out somebody else.

Morley Winograd: So we went through, I don't know, a list of a half a dozen people, Broadhead, who was a congressman, Blanchard, who was a congressman, some judge from the east side in Grosse Pointe who had a bit of a statewide following. And we each decided that we'd go talk to these individuals to decide if they were even interested in running. Because what's the point if somebody doesn't want to run? And I got the assignment of going to talk to Blanchard because I was the one who had maintained this personal friendship with him and helped him get elected to Congress.

Morley Winograd: And so my wife and I, over Thanksgiving, invited Jim and his then wife Paula to dinner in Troy. Restaurant's not there anymore. It's on Big Beaver. Very nice restaurant. And Jim was in town for the Thanksgiving recess and I told him that there was a group of people without identifying exactly who they were, who had influenced the Democratic Party, including me, who thought he'd make a fine candidate for governor, but we're interested in understanding if he was interested. And of course he immediately said he was not interested. He was happy being a congressman, blah, blah, blah. And I said, "Well, think about this, because there's a lot of things that go with being governor that don't go with being a congressman." And I started talking about the governor's mansion in Lansing and on Mackinac Island. And I'll never forget Paula's immediate reaction. She started focusing in on the conversation that she went, "Now wait a minute Jim, listen to what Morley as to say. Maybe there's something to this. It would mean you wouldn't be away in Washington. We could have a home together."

Morley Winograd: I later learned she wasn't a great cook and the fact that it came with a chef was another attraction to Paula. And so because his wife was suddenly saying, "Hey, you could be governor and I could be first lady." That he might be interested. So the conversation ended, he said, "Well I'd need to see some data." Because he knew I was a big polling guy, "that would suggest I have a chance and I'd need to see a ground swell of support. I don't want to step into this and get everybody else who was interested, mad." So went back to the garden club, so to speak, and told them what he said when they said, "Okay, I think we got a candidate. Let's get the polling together."

Morley Winograd: We did that and what can we do to convince him there's a ground swell of support? I said, "Well, we could create a draft Blanchard committee. Remember, none of us are have any official position in the party at that point. Well, what would that look like? Well, we get a bunch of our friends, we tell them it's Blanchard. We give them the signal that Labor will come along if Blanchard decides to run, but we don't do labor first. Make sure none of the people in the draft Blanchard committee can even be associated with Labor. We had got a wonderful woman named Shirley Gray who was my PR person back when I was party chairman to put it all together, figure out the copy for the ads. Some folks contributed some money for some ads and democratic oriented publications and suddenly there was a draft Blanchard committee. And Blanchard was delighted because then he could respond and say, "Well, I don't really want to leave my congressional district, but there seems to be a ground swell of support." He ran. Other people got out of the primary, some people were not smart enough to get out of the primary. Labor endorsed him in the primary, which was surprising to everybody. But that had already been decided back when I talked to him. And the rest is history.

Doug Ross: But this, in a way, it seems like if there's kind of a theme here, you become aware that the new deal coalition is not a foundation for Democrats winning elections and governing.

Morley Winograd: Correct.

Doug Ross: Certainly nationally. Right. And and, yeah, and an industrial states like Michigan as well. So then you begin to get involved with the movement within the Democratic Party.

Morley Winograd: Well I get involved with the Democratic leadership council. Well at first I convened a group of folks about what we should do about the memo after Mondale left. And I think memory tells me you were a member of that gathering in my addition to my house out in Troy. But we had been meeting, not necessarily the same players, but I had been convening meetings when I was party chairman, after I was party chairman, of some of the power of the Michigan Democratic Party. It's how we actually ended up drafting Blanchard if you will. But by then Blanchard's governor, he's been successful in '82 he's going to run again at '86 none of us knew that it would be as easy a reelection as it turned out to be. And so in '85 and '86 we started talking about what's the

alternative approach that would still be democratic and you were pushing a kind of an opportunity society and making it.

Morley Winograd: One of the problems with all of the McGovern influence in the party was this kind of desire to mandate outcomes, to have the government dictate how society should function and therefore make sure it did function that way instead of having incentives for it to function that way and achieve the same goals differently. And we talked opportunity, responsibility. You and I did a presentation, we got active in the Democratic Leadership Council, which got active without our help. After the 1990 election we did a presentation that I wrote about in the book I wrote with Dudley Buffa about taking control of, we did a presentation on opportunity responsibility where the key themes that the Democrats could use to win the election in '92. Some guy named Bill Clinton who was vice chair of the DLC, listened to us, brought us in afterwards and said, "Yeah, that's got some potential."

Morley Winograd: And he went off and organized DLC stuff and decided that opportunity and responsibility was too much of a Republican message and that we needed to add the word community to it. And so he went out and built a rival operation inside the party playing off the kind of Jesse Jackson, old McGovern wing of the party on opportunity, responsibility and community. And he was saying those words. I remember being startled by it in his last campaign appearance in 1992 in Denver, Colorado in the morning. He got off on a plane, pretty hoarse hoping to carry Colorado and lectured the crowd on opportunity, responsibility and community. So we had some influence on all of that.

Doug Ross: But things keep going. The advantage of living long enough is things keep changing and the battle, as I recall, part of what the DLC was trying to do was win back enough white votes for Democrats to be able to win elections.

Morley Winograd: Suburban voters, white voters don't really care to characterize it.

Doug Ross: Right. And of course the southern governors, the progressive southern governors were a great group to think about that with because they needed to get what, I remember 35% or some of the white vote.

Morley Winograd: Yeah. Clinton, Gore, although he wasn't governor in Tennessee, a Senator, a fellow in Georgia, Nunn, who was chair of the DLC when Clinton was vice chair when he gave that speech. He wasn't there that day to his great regret. And he was instead voting against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution or something. No, against the Vietnam War, against the Gulf War resolution. And the whole host of those folks. That was the basic national democratic play, was find a southern governor who can again polish off the rough edge and still carry by being a Democrat enough northern states and enough votes elsewhere to do fine. None of that is relevant to today's demographics. It's about as relevant as it turned out, the new deal coalition was in the 1970's but so that's what we thought back then.

Doug Ross: Then the demographic shift again. And you become one of the more outspoken people certainly on the progressive side about these changing demographics. Those on the conservative side haven't recognized it yet.

Morley Winograd: Well, it's interesting because in the latest book that I've written with Mike Hayes, we've written three, all about the influence of this young generation. Millennials born between '82 and 2003 who are kind of like the GI generation in terms of generational type, not necessarily in terms of public program. But certainly tolerant, liberal voters. Two thirds for Obama and in '08 and 60% in 2012. margin of victory in 2012 voters under 30. They are a heavily minority generation, 40% are non white. One out of five have an immigrant parent. So they bring a whole different coalition structure to the Democratic Party.

Morley Winograd: One that is in our newest book, Millennial Majority of points out, puts the Democrats in the same position they were in the ironically in the 30's, 40's, and 50's where they have a natural coalition that's a majority coalition that the only way the other side can now win is the same challenge we were fighting against somewhat without knowledge in the Reagan era, which is to figure out a way, despite the fact that the demographics work against us and the politics work against us. And that DLC was great for that and the Republicans are now going to need their own version of a DLC to figure out a way inside a world in which gay marriage, the majority position in the country, legalizing marijuana for that matter, is a majority position in the country only because 75, 80% of millennials believe in those ideas.

Doug Ross: What do you see then as this, not so much emerging, but maybe emergent coalition that gives the Democrats at least a natural majority?

Morley Winograd: It's millennials, again.

Doug Ross: Explain who millennials are.

Morley Winograd: '82 to 2003 means they're either teenagers or 20 year olds, a few of them in their thirties. But they'll be more than one out of every three Americans by the end of the decade. They're the largest generation in American history, bigger than the Boomers, but they also are a unified generation. 60, 65% of them tend to think one way. Some people say that's good, some people say it's bad, but in politics it's really good to have them on your side. A very social media oriented. That's how everybody recognizes them. They along with minorities, whether they're millennial age or not, even though millennials are heavily very diverse, and now minorities of course, including the growing Hispanic and Asian American vote. And women, particularly single women, particularly unmarried women and educated part of the population, together make up roughly 53, 55% democratic identifiers and so on. At this point, all you have to do is carry your Democrats. You can listen to all that conversation on a network television about independence. It's actually irrelevant today. It used to be relevant, used to be ticket splitters than independence. No longer relevant, maybe relevant again.

But all the Democrats have to do is carry their vote and they win nationally, not necessarily in any congressional district, but nationally.

Doug Ross: So bring it back a little bit to Michigan. Okay. So once again was sort of the, the ground has shifted in some fairly dramatic ways. If the new chair of the Democratic Party were to call you up and say, "Gee, Morley, you've been through a few of these changes, what should we be thinking about? How does the Michigan Democratic Party begin to position itself? First of all, does that natural majority exist in Michigan?

Morley Winograd: Yes, absolutely it does. And Michigan does very well by its national candidates and for that matter its senatorial candidates. It's still having a problem with that governor thing. Governor Granholm, to her credit, used the reverse of the old Republican ticket splitter strategy. She got women to split off and vote for a Democrat in western Michigan. She did it in primary campaign. She did it in general elections. We did some of that in Oakland County at one point. Certainly Blanchard did it with the nomination and Martha Griffiths's as the lieutenant governor, which was a recommendation from me and and pollster, who's now my coauthor Mike Hayes.

Morley Winograd: But, but ticket splitting isn't what is necessary as a strategy in Michigan anymore. Now you need a message and a messenger that can attract this coalition and solidify its support. And in Michigan, obviously African Americans, have a larger share of the population than Hispanics or Asians, but those populations are growing, young people very much out there. I will give you an example. In my current state of California, Jerry Brown, who I've sort of had as a fellow traveler in the course of my political career just on age, not because we were allies at any time that I can think of. He pulled off a major coup in California, which was to fix their budget deficit, going back to the Blanchard days, by raising taxes, same solution Blanchard had. But he, when he campaigned, and then to his credit in his actual governance said he wasn't going to raise taxes to find that revenue without a vote of the people. And so he put a temporary sales tax increase and a more permanent income tax increase on the ballot.

Morley Winograd: And carried it by making it very clear what he was going to do with the money. He told people in advance that he was gonna stop the rapid rise in college tuition in California at the public universities if the proposition passed. Then the California State Legislature passed a law making it possible to register to vote online. The law took effect 60 days before the election, but closed 30 days before the election. Over a million new voters under the age of 30 registered to vote.

Morley Winograd: The sales tax and income tax proposal carried with their votes because he was working that coalition, whether he did it consciously or unconsciously, he was working that new majority coalition of millennials, minorities, and educated and young women. I think Michigan, I wouldn't recommend the messenger would be as old as Jerry Brown, but I think they need both the message that appeals to

this new coalition, and the new chairman needs to get involved in candidate recruitment. We spent a lot of time as party chair after we got the nuts and bolts fixed looking for candidates.

Doug Ross: That are congruent with that coalition.

Morley Winograd: Where they're congruent with that coalition.

Doug Ross: To kind of tie all this up, ask you a question and bring it round. What was it back when you were very young, you talked about getting involved and running the voter registration drive in 1968. What created your interest in politics? What ignited your imagination around that side, I wanna do that?

Morley Winograd: I was involved, as I think about it, in high school, government student council elections. Politics as an activity was always kind of a little bit of an interest, but I was a freshman at the University of Michigan when Kennedy was campaigning, and he came to the Michigan union at the end of a whistle train stop tour that my now good friend, didn't know her at the time, Mary Ryan, and then that was the end of her name back then, now Mary Ryan Terris, helped organize.

Morley Winograd: So, when they got to Ann Arbor, they at the campaign if they ended up whistle stopping through Michigan, decided that they would give a speech about this idea they had called the Peace Corps. He was late in the campaign a day and was always late, and he gave a speech on the steps of the Michigan Union to a crowd, large crowd, lot of co-eds in the crowd. It was past curfew in the 1964 co-eds, but the university extended the curfew so they could come and see this glamorous young looking candidate for president.

Morley Winograd: At about 1 o'clock in the morning he finally ended up giving the speech about the Peace Corps. It was a very inspirational speech about changing the world for the better. And I do remember at the time thinking, "Okay, that is something that I should get involved in." So a lot of that came from that Kennedy inspiration.

Doug Ross: It's 53 years later. As hopeful, skeptical, cynical, how would you characterize your view of politics and governance in this country?

Morley Winograd: I'm still very optimistic. It's easy to get cynical in politics. It's a profession that's difficult to keep your hands clean if you've been involved in it, I think I have done that, and you sort of have to go with the Lincoln approach, so well captured in that movie, of making any deal you need to make in order to get to where you want to go, knowing in your gut that where you want to go is the right place to go. It's been a love of my life. I've thoroughly enjoyed it. I'm still in the middle of it.

Morley Winograd: I'm still actively working on behalf of not just the progressive causes in the Democratic party around this new coalition, but on behalf of this newest

generation so that they have the same opportunities our generation had. We are the lucky generation. Nobody talks about a silent generation, they talk about boomers, but the generation just before boomers between New Deal GI's and we got the right breaks in life. We never had to get through the Great Depression. We got a lot of money from houses that soared in value. So we've done very well and I hope to still give some back to that generation.

Doug Ross: Thank you.

Morley Winograd: Thank you.